Articles on Other Topics
“The Moral Problem of Self-Righteousness.” The Journal of Value Inquiry. 44:4 (December 2010): 477-87.
The designation “self-righteous” is a condemnation, if not an outright insult. This is paradoxical, as righteousness or justice is an aspect, perhaps the very foundation, of self-righteousness. Self-righteousness consists in either exaggerated or inappropriate claims of moral injury or moral improvement; or excessive or misplaced public moral pronouncements, which may be true or false. In the first case, the aptness of the charge of being self-righteous, and so a moral assessment of the actions or speech which are the target of the charge, rests on the acceptance or rejection of antecedent moral claims. Yet in the second case the resolution of the moral issue is different. Even when we are in the right, and know that we are clearly in the right, there is good reason to refrain from the kind of behavior that warrants a charge of self-righteousness.
“Love, Beauty, and Yeats’s ‘Anne Gregory.” Philosophy and Literature. 34:2 (October 2010): 348-358.
The speaker of W.B. Yeats’s poem, “For Anne Gregory” tells Anne that she is doomed to be loved, not for herself alone, but for her yellow hair. Anne finds this prospect so unappealing that she threatens to dye her hair. Why should Anne be dismayed, and what is it to love someone for herself “alone”? These questions take us to the heart of some crucial philosophical problems of romantic love. Rationality has a place here, but not the place it is usually given. We need to assess the rationality of the beloved, as well as of the lover.
“What is Offensive about Offensive Jokes?” Philosophy Today 51:4 (Winter 2007): 458-65.
Joking is a social activity, subject to moral consideration and assessment. Yet it is not easy to say when a joke is offensive, what makes an offensive joke offensive, and to determine where the moral fault lies when there is one. There are two dominant positions in the small philosophical literature on the morality of humour: 1) cognitivist or or belief-based and 2) consequentialist. Worthy of note yet not fitting into either category is 3) Ted Cohen’s recent anti-theoretical account of the morality of offensive jokes. In this paper I argue that the cognitivist position is fundamentally flawed as an account of the immorality of offensive jokes. The consequentialist position is more adequate but ultimately unsatisfactory. I suggest, contra Cohen, that the ethics of humour is an appropriate area of theorizing, and propose an account of the moral fault of offensive jokes which is broadly within the virtue ethics tradition.
“Descartes’ Rhetoric: Roads, Foundations, and Difficulties in the Method,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 36:1 (2003): 22-38.
Close attention to Descartes's rhetorical strategies in the Discourse reveals a tension between the individual and the social or communal aspects of scientific method. This tension is manifest in the conflicting metaphors Descartes uses to characterize scientific and epistemological progress. The best known of these metaphors (from architecture and town-planning) emphasize individual effort. Yet recurrent metaphors characterizing scientific progress as a road point to a more social or communal view of science. I consider what implications we can draw regarding Descartes's view of the nature of science, scientific method, and of the role of nonscientists in the quest for certain knowledge.
“Self-Scrutiny in Maimonides’ Ethical and Religious Thought,” Laval théologique et philosophique 58:3 (October 2002): 531-43.
Self-scrutiny has long been considered necessary for the development of virtue. Maimonides's insistence on the importance of self-scrutiny in the formation of character has its roots in Aristotle, but is developed by him in such a way as to be innovative. Three related themes are discussed here: Maimonides's conception of the role self-scrutiny plays in moral development; how the imperative of self-scrutiny shapes his analysis of Mosaic law; and the specifically religious function of self-scrutiny.
“The Individuality in the Deed: Hegel on Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 37/38 (1998): 73-84.
My goal in this paper is to illuminate Hegel’s discussion of forgiveness and reconciliation in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion by examining his treatment of the same topic in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I begin with an analysis of forgiveness and reconciliation in the Phenomenology (specifically ¶666-671), and then show how the discussion there is necessary for comprehension of the religious aspects of forgiveness and reconciliation in the Lectures. I suggest some limitations in Hegel’s account, specifically with regard to his conception of evil, and the discontinuity between the human and divine aspects of forgiveness and reconciliation.
“An Overlooked Aspect of Love in Spinoza’s Ethics,” Iyyun 47 (January 1998): 41-55.
Spinoza's definition of love ("pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause") is in stark contrast to his all but mystical conception of the intellectual love of God. Are the positive values of love for God found only in love for a supreme Deity, or can something of its unselfishness be present in our love for one another? I argue that there is a more subtle and complex view of love implicit in the Ethics, and that Spinoza does allow for the possibility of a sophisticated, mature love between human beings. This third type of love, which may be characterized as "self-determined," mediates between the extremes of love based on inadequate ideas (what Spinoza calls the "common sort of love" V, 20S), and the intellectual love of God.
“Soloviev’s Critique of Progress in Three Conversations,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, 33:2 (June 1991): 101-112.